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Abstract
Randomized response is attractive for privacy preserving data collection because the
provided privacy can be quantified by means such as differential privacy. However, recovering
and analyzing statistics involving multiple dependent randomized binary attributes can
be difficult, posing a significant barrier to use. In this work, we address this problem by
identifying and analyzing a family of response randomizers that change each binary attribute
independently with the same probability. Modes of Google’s Rappor randomizer as well as
applications of two well-known classical randomized response methods, Warner’s original
method and Simmons’ unrelated question method, belong to this family. We show that
randomizers in this family transform multinomial distribution parameters by an iterated
Kronecker product of an invertible and bisymmetric 2× 2 matrix. This allows us to present
a simple and efficient algorithm for obtaining unbiased maximum likelihood parameter
estimates for k-way marginals from randomized responses and provide theoretical bounds
on the statistical efficiency achieved. We also describe the efficiency – differential privacy
tradeoff. Importantly, both randomization of responses and the estimation algorithm are
simple to implement, an aspect critical to technologies for privacy protection and security.
1 Introduction
Randomized response, introduced by Warner in 1965 (Warner 1965), works by allowing survey
respondents to sample their response according to a particular probability distribution. This
provides privacy while still allowing the surveyor to gain insights about the queried population.
Due to its suitability for large scale privacy preserving data collection, randomized response has
lately enjoyed a resurgence in interest from Apple and Google, among others.
As an example of randomized response, consider a population of parties each holding an indepen-
dent sensitive bit b with P (b = 1) = p where p is unknown. We want to estimate p and therefore
randomly select m parties i to ask for their bit values bi for this purpose. Tools from information
security allow us to collect the bit values and compute the estimate pˆ = m−1
∑
i bi of p without
access to any proper subset sum of bit values. However, if pˆ = 1 we can infer that bi = 1 for all
observed bits. Even if we are trusted with this knowledge, disseminating pˆ allows outsiders to
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infer bi = 1 for any party i known to be a contributor. Knowing this, parties might not be willing
to share their bit-value directly. However, if each contributor is allowed to lie with a probability
q < 12 , then we can argue that
1−q
q is the upper limit to which any adversary can update their
belief regarding the true value of any contributed bit. If parties then agree to contribute, we can
still estimate p, albeit at a loss of statistical efficiency.
In 1977, Tore Dalenius defined disclosure about an object x by a statistic v with respect to a
property p to have happened if the value p(x) can be determined more accurately with knowledge
of v than without (Dalenius 1977). A goal of information security is preserving the integrity
circles of trust. Mechanisms to achieve this include access control, communication security, and
secure multi-party computation. These mechanisms have in common that that the protected
information is well circumscribed, and the states of allowed access are discrete. Disclosure control,
on the other hand, provides a tool for considering questions regarding the consequence of access,
and how to deal with information not necessarily well circumscribed. An emerging standard
for defining privacy based on disclosure control is differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006). The
likelihood ratio 1−qq from the example above is an example of a quantification of disclosure risk,
and the log transformation of this ratio is parameterized in differential privacy. We can also
view the above randomization as enabling continuously graded access to each contributor’s bit,
quantifiable by entropy, for example.
In the past, when surveys were conducted manually with responses recorded on paper, surveys
were generally limited to a single randomized dichotomous question. It was simply too expensive
to survey enough individuals to support efficient recovery of parameter estimates with multiple
randomized questions. With the advent of computerized surveys, enrollment is much easier,
particularly if the data is collected automatically. With increased enrollment comes the ability
to consider multiple randomized values per respondent and still obtain efficient estimates of
population distribution parameters. On the other hand, multiple randomized values per response
significantly increases the difficulty of analysis. For example, the first publication regarding
Google’s 2014 Rappor technology for automatically collecting end user data with randomized
response (Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova 2014) only considered each bit in an n-bit response
independently as if it were the only bit randomized. The consideration of several bits jointly,
had to wait for a subsequent publication (Fanti, Pihur, and Erlingsson 2015). Neither of these
publications provided theoretical bounds of efficiency loss due to randomization. The point is
that analyzing multi-question randomized response can be difficult, potentially causing surveyors
to adopt less effective privacy protections.
We address this problem by defining a family of very easily implementable randomizers of length
n-bit strings or surveys with n sensitive dichotomous questions. For the randomizers in this family,
we provide simply computable distribution parameter estimators as well as statistical efficiency
bounds for these. As these randomizers act on each response bit independently, marginals can be
queried and recovered independently. This is helpful when bit k to query is chosen based on the
length k − 1 based marginal already queried, or when the bits of responses are distributed among
multiple sources.
1.1 Contributions in Detail
A randomized response method can be seen as a randomized algorithm M that takes a response x
as input and produces a randomized response r =M(x). Encoding both x and r as length n bit
strings, the algorithm M can be characterized by a 2n × 2n matrix C where the entry indexed by
(r, x) contains P (r =M(x)). IfM is applied independently to each of m strings sampled according
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to a multinomial distribution with parameters m ∈ N and pi ∈ [0, 1]2n , the resulting strings are
expected to be multinomially distributed with parameters m and Cpi. Consequently, if C is
invertible we can obtain a maximum likelihood estimate for pi from the histogram y of observed
randomized responses as m−1C−1y. If C is not invertible, using the expectation maximization
algorithm can be a suitable, albeit more complicated alternative for obtaining estimates. In
general, the expression of C can be such that estimators for the population parameters are not
available in closed form (Barabesi, Franceschi, and Marcheselli 2012).
We first recognize that a randomizer M that randomizes each bit in a length n string x inde-
pendently in an identical manner can be represented by the iterated Kronecker product C of a
bisymmetric 2× 2 matrix (Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.2). For the family of such randomizers,
our contributions are developments of
• a definition of C−1 in terms of an iterated Kronecker products of a bisymmetric 2 × 2
matrix,
• closed form formulas for the individual entries of both C and C−1, of which at most n+ 1
are distinct in each matrix (Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 1),
• a closed form formula for the trace of the covariance matrix for the unbiased maximum
likelihood estimator m−1C−1Y (Lemma 4.5),
• a closed form formula for the effective loss in sample size for estimating pi due to ran-
domization (Theorem 4.6) together with concentration bounds for uniformly distributed pi
(Proposition 4.7),
• an analysis of the loss of effective sample size in terms of the afforded level of differential
privacy (Theorem 4.9).
As the Kronecker product can be implemented in linear time in the number of entries in the
result, C and C−1 for iterated bisymmetric randomizers can be computed by an algorithm that is
linear in the number of entries of these matrices (Proposition 4.8). We show that this algorithm
is simple to state and simple to implement (Section 4.2), which facilities adoption as well as
verification of implementation correctness. These are both critical aspects of algorithms applied
for privacy protection and security.
Finally, we show that our results apply to modes of Rappor, application of Warner’s original
randomizer (Warner 1965) and Simmon’s unrelated question randomizer (Greenberg et al. 1969).
2 Related Work
Randomized response was first introduced primarily as a technique to reduce bias introduced by
absent or untruthful responses to a single potentially sensitive dichotomous question (Warner
1965). Much research into randomized response is in the context of an interview tool for social
sciences research. Here, randomization devices generally consist of a physical source of randomness
like a spinner or a coin, together with a protocol for how the respondent should use it. These
devices are then evaluated in terms of both human factors, e.g., protocol compliance and response
rates, as well as the statistical utility of their randomized output (Umesh and Peterson 1991;
Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005). Randomized response surveys carry a double burden of requiring
additional time and effort on behalf of the respondents, as well as requiring an enrollment that
increases rapidly in the number of questions that require randomization. This might explain why
randomized response designs for single dichotomous sensitive questions (Warner 1965; Greenberg et
al. 1969; Folsom et al. 1973; Blair, Imai, and Zhou 2015) are much more common in the literature
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than for multiple sensitive questions (Bourke 1982; Barabesi, Franceschi, and Marcheselli 2012)
or polychotomous questions (Abul-Ela, Greenberg, and Horvitz 1967). Furthermore, multiple
authors point out that while there exists a substantial body of methods research, “there have
been very few substantive applications [of randomized response techniques]” (Blair, Imai, and
Zhou 2015; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005; Umesh and Peterson 1991).
However, as automated data collection on very large populations has become available, interest
in randomized response involving multiple independent questions has emerged. Two examples are
Google’s Rappor (Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova 2014) technology for collecting end-user data,
and Apple’s technology for collecting analytics data in MacOS and iOS (Tang et al. 2017; Apple
2017).
The view of randomizers as transformations of multinomial distribution parameters has been
investigated in the context of local differential privacy (Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright 2013).
Kairouz et al. (Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath 2014) analyze what they call staircase mechanisms,
which in the context of this paper can be thought of as family of randomized response mechanisms
where C = BD, where B is a matrix that contains at most two values, located on the diagonal and
elsewhere, respectively, and D is a diagonal matrix. In particular, they investigate a randomized
response mechanism k-RR where D is the identity matrix. For k-RR they show that this
mechanism is optimal with respect to the tradeoff between differential privacy and utility defined
in terms of KL-divergence. In subsequent work (Kairouz, Bonawitz, and Ramage 2016) they
further analyze Warner’s original proposal, their k-RR staircase mechanism and Rappor under
general loss functions. They show that for n = 1 Warner’s proposal is optimal for any loss and
any differential privacy level. This is the only case where the k-RR family of staircase mechanisms
intersects the family of randomizers presented here in this paper. Furthermore, their analysis is
based on entire responses being known up front and it is not clear how to apply their work in the
case where a response is an interactively queried sequence of n > 1 randomized bits.
3 Randomizing Mechanisms
3.1 Length n Bit Strings and the Multinomial Distribution
Let B = {0, 1}, and let ∧,∨,⊕ denote logical and, or, and exclusive or. For x, y, u ∈ Bn let
x ≥ y ⇐⇒ x ∧ y = y, x =u y ⇐⇒ x ∧ u = y ∧ u, and [x]u = {y|x =u y}. Now, let
ei ∈ Bn be the string with a single 1 at position i, and let for a set of indices K, eK ≥ ei ⇐⇒
i ∈ K. For x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Bn, |x| =
∑n−1
i=0 xi. Also let η : Bn → N be defined as
η(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) =
∑n−1
i=0 xi2i, and let ς = n−1. The function η lets us treat element x ∈ Bn as
a 0-based index η(x) which we will do often. Also, let  denote the coordinate-wise (Hadamard)
product.
Consider an experiment that produces an outcome in {0, 2, . . . , k− 1} for some positive integer k,
where outcome i is produced with probability pi. Let m indicate a fixed number of independent
experiments and letXi denote the number of times outcome i is observed among them experiments.
Note that
∑k−1
i=0 Xi = m. Then X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xk−1) follows a a multinomial distribution
Mult(m,pi) where pi = (p0, p1, . . . , pk−1). The variables Xi each have expectation mpi and
variance mpi(1− pi), and we can think of a realization of X as a histogram over the outcomes of
the m experiments. Also, when m = 1, X follows a categorical distribution, and when m = 1 and
k = 2, X follows a Bernoulli distribution. If experiments produce outcomes in Bn for n ∈ N, we
let Xi be the number of times ς(i) ∈ Bn is observed among m experiments.
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The estimator pˆi∗(m) = m−1X is a maximum likelihood estimator for pi (e.g., (Lehmann and
Casella 1998, example 6.11)) and the covariance matrix of pˆi∗(m) is
cov(pˆi∗(m)) = m−1(diag(pi  (1− pi) + pi  pi)− pipiT ) = m−1(diag(pi)− pipiT )
where diag(v) is the square matrix with the elements of v along the diagonal.
3.2 Randomizers as Linear Transformations
For a string of bits of length n, we will think of a randomizing mechanism as a function
M : Bn × B∞ → Bn × B∞ that takes a bit string and an infinite sequence of independent
uniformly distributed random bits that serves as the source of randomness, and returns the
randomized string and what remains of the source of randomness. Since the source of randomness
consists of uniformly and independently distributed bits, we will let the randomness be implicit
and state that randomizer M is a randomized algorithm M : Bn → Bn. We can define randomizer
M in terms of a 2n × 2n conditional probability matrix
CMr,x = P (r =M(x)).
Then, if C = CM and X is Mult(m,pi), then Y = CX is Mult(m,Cpi). If C invertible, then we
can let pˆi(m) = m−1C−1Y be an estimator for pi with
E(pˆi(m)) = m−1C−1 E(Y ) = m−1C−1mCpi = pi,
from which we see that it is unbiased. The invariance property of maximum likelihood estimators
(Casella and Berger 2002, theorem 7.2.10) states that if θˆ is a maximum likelihood estimator for
parameter θ, then for any function g we have that g(θˆ) is a maximum likelihood estimator for
g(θ). Consequently, for invertible matrix C we have that pˆi(m) = C−1m−1Y = m−1C−1Y is an
unbiased maximum likelihood estimator of pi. The covariance matrix of pˆi(m) is
cov(pˆi(m)) = cov(m−1C−1Y ) = m−1
(
C−1diag(Cpi)C−1T − pipiT
)
.
Proposition 3.1. If
L(m) = Tr(cov(pˆi(m)))Tr(cov(pˆi∗(m)))
where Tr(A) denotes the sum of the elements along the diagonal of square matrix A. Then
L = L(m) = L(m′) for any m,m′ > 0, and for α ≥ 1,
E
(‖pˆi(αLm)− pi‖22) ≤ E (‖pˆi∗(m)− pi‖22) .
By the above proposition, the loss of quality of estimation when using randomized responses over
non-randomized responses can be described by L.
4 Bitwise Independent Randomizers
Let (x : xs) ∈ Bn be a length n sequence of bits with first bit x and length n− 1 tail xs, and let
M = (M ′ : Ms) be a sequence of bit randomizers. Now define
R(, x) = R(M, ) = 
R(M ′ : Ms, x′ : xs) =M ′(x′) : R(Ms, xs)
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where  is the empty sequence. We will think of R as a function that maps a length n sequence of
bit randomizers M to a randomizer R(M) of length n bit strings. We note that R(M) randomizes
each bit independently, and that any randomizer of length n bit strings that randomizes each bit
independently can be written as R(M ′) for some sequence of bit randomizers M ′. We will call
these bitwise independent randomizers.
We first repeat a result regarding bitwise independent randomizers, first established by Bourke
(Bourke 1982), namely that R(M) is defined by the Kronecker product ⊗ of its constituent bit
randomizers.
Theorem 4.1 (Bourke 1982). For a sequence M = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) of independent bit
randomizers, CR(M) = CM0 ⊗ CM1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ CMn−1 .
We now examine a special case of bitwise independent randomizers in more detail.
4.1 Iterated Bisymmetric Randomizers
Let a bisymmetric bit randomizer M be a bit randomizer that has a matrix
CM = Ca,b =
(
a b
b a
)
that is symmetric about both its main diagonals, i.e., is a bisymmetric matrix. We now consider
bitwise independent randomizers generated by a sequence of identical bisymmetric bit randomizers.
Definition 4.1. The iterated Kronecker product of bisymmetric Ca,b is
Ca,b(n) =
{
Ca,b ⊗ Ca,b(n− 1) if n > 0,
(1) otherwise.
Proposition 4.2. Let M = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) be a sequence of identical bisymmetric bit
randomizers with CMi = Ca,b. Then CR(M) = Ca,b(n).
The iterated Kronecker product preserves properties of Ca,b in the sense of the following.
Proposition 4.3. The matrix Ca,b(n)
a. is bisymmetric,
b. has a constant diagonal, and
c. has a constant anti-diagonal, and
d. contains at most n+ 1 distinct entries.
As a consequence we will call M with CM = Ca,b(n) iterated bisymmetric randomizers. We
also note that since a column in CM contains a distribution, the sum of entries must be 1.
Consequently, b = 1− a, and we can define Ca(n) = Ca,1−a(n), and let CM = Ca(n) for iterated
bisymmetric randomizer M . Our main results regarding iterated bisymmetric randomizers are
the following. First we turn to the results regarding CM and C−1M .
Theorem 4.4. Let M be a randomizer with CM = Ca(n). Then
CMr,x = an−d(1− a)d
where d = |r ⊕ x|. If a 6= 12 , then
C−1M = C a2a−1 (n).
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Corollary 1. If a 6= 12 ,
CM
−1
x,r =
an−d(a− 1)d
(2a− 1)n
for d = |x⊕ r|.
We now apply the above results to determine bounds for the statistical efficiency of iterated
bisymmetric randomizers.
Lemma 4.5. Let pˆi be the unbiased estimator defined in Section 3.2 associated with the randomizer
M with invertible C = CM = Ca(n). If a 6= 12 the trace of the variance-covariance matrix of pˆi is
given by
Tr(cov(pˆi)) = m−1(c− s)
where
c =
(
a2 + (1− a)2
(2a− 1)2
)n
,
and s = piTpi =
∑
x p
2
x.
Theorem 4.6. For piTpi < 1, a 6= 1/2, and pˆi associated with M as in Lemma 4.5 the loss as
defined in Proposition 3.1 is given by
L = fL(s) =
(
a2+(1−a)2
(2a−1)2
)n
− s
1− s
for s = piTpi =
∑
x p
2
x. Also, fL(2−n) ≤ L.
When pi is a random uniformly sampled probability distribution on 2n categories1, the quantity
piTpi, also known as the Greenwood statistic, has expected value E(piTpi) = 22n+1 and variance
Var(piTpi) = 4(2
n−1))
(2n+1)2 (2n+2) (2n+3) (Moran 1947). As pi is usually unknown, we can approximate
the loss L as L(n) = fL( 22n+1 ). We state the following about the quality of this approximation.
Proposition 4.7. For n > 2 and pi a random uniformly sampled probability distribution on n
categories,
P (1 ≤ E(fL(pi
Tpi))
fL( 22n+1 )
≤ 1 + δ(n)) ≥ 0.99.
where δ(n) ∈ O(2−3n) and δ(3) < 0.2386.
Also, δ(4) < 0.0029. Finally, we can compare iterated bisymmetric randomizers in terms of the
efficiency of their estimators pˆi, which in turn means comparing their associated values for c in
Lemma 4.5. Here smaller is better.
4.2 A Simple Algorithm
A randomizer with CM = Ca(n) can be implemented as M(x) = x ⊕ u, where u is a length n
sequence of independent Bernoulli trials with success probability 1− a.
Let (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) be m n-bit randomized responses where each bit has been randomized by an
independent bisymmetric bit randomizer with CM = Ca, and let ri[K] denote the sub-sequence of
ri indexed by K ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} in order. By Theorem 4.4 we can then estimate the marginal
multinomial distribution parameter pˆiK for the bits indexed by the k bits in K as follows:
1distributed as the flat Dirichlet distribution of order 2n.
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1. let y = (y0, y1, . . . , y2k−1) where yi = |{j | η(rj [K]) = i}|, i.e., y is the histogram over
observed sub-sequences, and
2. pˆiK = m−1C a2a−1 (k) y.
Proposition 4.8. The simply recursive algorithm Ca(n) can be implemented to run in time that
is linear in the number of entries of the output matrix.
A Python code example for implementing the algorithm above is as follows.
Implementation 1.
from numpy import array, kron, log2, bincount as bc, arange
def C(n, a):
c, z = array([[a, 1-a], [1-a, a]]), array([1])
return z if n < 1 else kron(c, C(n-1, a))
def pihat(a, Y):
m, n = float(sum(Y)), int(log2(len(Y)))
return C(n, a/(2*a - 1)).dot(Y)/m
def hist(R):
_,n = R.shape
x = 2**(n-1-arange(n))
return bc(R.dot(x), minlength = 2**n)
For input R being a m× n numpy array of m randomized length n binary responses and K a list
of column indices, the call pihat(a, hist(R[:,K])) computes the value for pˆiK .
4.3 Privacy Considerations
The results established so far are about efficiency aspects of estimating multinomial parameters
as functions of population and randomization parameters. We now briefly turn to a measure of
privacy risk for bit-wise independent randomizers.
Now, let M be a bit randomizer such that entries in CM all are positive, i.e., randomization
happens for both possible inputs. We will in this section only consider such bit randomizers. Let
lM (r) =
maxx P (r =M(x))
minx P (r =M(x))
.
The likelihood ratio lM (r) can be thought of representing the best evidence for preferring one
hypothetical input over another when given the randomized output r. This is reflected in the
definition of Differential Privacy (Dwork et al. 2006), where a randomized algorithm M can be
considered α-differentially private if, for any measurable subset S of possible outputs, and inputs
D and D′ obtained from any two sets of individuals that overlap in all but one individual, we
have that
P (M(D) ∈ S)
P (M(D′) ∈ S) ≤ exp(α),
and the probabilities are over the randomness available to the algorithm.
Now let lM = maxr lM (r), then it follows thatM is a log(lM )-differentially private algorithm. Now
consider R(M) for n bit randomizers M = (Mi)n−1i=0 such that lMi ≥ lMi+1 , and let k ≥ |x⊕ x′|
for any x, x′ given as input to R(M). Then l =
∏k−1
i=0 lMi can be an upper bound of privacy loss
for any respondent. Specifically, R(M) is then a log(l)-differentially private algorithm.
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Now assume that M is bisymmetric. Exploiting the structure of M , we get that lM = la = r(a)
where r(a) = max(a−1(1 − a), a(1 − a)−1). If R(M) is an iterated bisymmetric randomizer,
i.e., CR(M) = Ca(m), then l = (la)k, and we have that R(M) is α-differentially private for
α = log(lka) = k log(r(a)). This is particularly useful if a is an invertible function aφ(φ). Then,
we can write
αφ(φ) = k log(r(aφ(φ))), and
φα(α) = a−1φ (r
−1(exp(α/k))).
We have from Lemma 4.5 that c is a function ca(a). We can now view c as a function of φ by
cφ = ca ◦ aφ, where ◦ denotes function composition. Expanding further, we can let c be a function
of α as cα = cφ ◦ φα. This means that
cα = ca ◦ aφ ◦ φα
= ca ◦ aφ ◦ a−1φ ◦ r
−1 ◦ exp ◦ (x 7→ x/k)
= ca ◦ r−1 ◦ exp ◦ (x 7→ x/k).
The last equation shows that cα is independent of the functional shape of a(φ), and therefore this
holds for L as well. In other words, from a perspective of differential privacy, the performance
of iterated bisymmetric randomizers in terms of L is independent of the functional shape of
invertible a(φ). The above reasoning proves the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.9. For any α-differentially private iterated bisymmetric randomizer for inputs not
differing in more than k bits, for c from Lemma 4.5,
c ≥ cα(α) =
(
exp(2α/k) + 1)
(exp(α/k)− 1)2
)n
,
and for L from Theorem 4.6,
L ≥ L(α) = cα(α)− s1− s
where s = piTpi.
Combining the above with Theorem 2 in (Kairouz, Bonawitz, and Ramage 2016), stating the
optimality of Warner’s randomizer with regards to the privacy-utility tradeoff for any loss function
and privacy level, we conclude the following.
Corollary 2. For n = 1, bisymmetric iterated randomizers are optimal with respect to loss L for
any privacy level α.
5 Case Studies
5.1 The Unrelated Uniform Question Device
In Simmons’ unrelated question method, the interviewer asks the respondent to answer a question
randomly selected between the sensitive question of interest and an unrelated question that the
respondent presumably has no problem answering truthfully. The unrelated question is chosen
with probability p. Here we analyze the variant of this method where the unrelated question is
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“Flip a coin. Is it heads?”. In other words, the case where interviewer knows that the answer to
the unrelated question is uniformly distributed in the study sample.
Let A : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be given by
A(x, u, z) = x (1− u) + z  u
where 1 is the string with all elements 1. Letting Bnp denote a sequence of n independent Bernoulli
variables each taking value 1 with probability p, the randomizer M(x) can then be defined as
M(x) = A(x, u, z) where u and z are realizations of Bnp and Bn0.5 variables, respectively.
We start by noting that if A(x, u, z) = r, then u ≥ d = x⊕ r. Now, let U , and Z be independent
Bnp and Bn0.5 variables, respectively. Then
P (r = A(x, U, Z)) =
∑
u≥d
P (U = u)P (Z =u r),
were d = r⊕ x. Now, P (U = u) = p|u|(1− p)n−|u| and P (Z =u r) = (1/2)|u|. Furthermore, there
are 2n−|d| strings u such that u ≥ d, and of those (n−|d|i ) have |u| = i+ |d|. Consequently,
cr,x = P (r = A(x, U, Z)) =
n−|d|∑
i=0
(
n− |d|
i
)(p
2
)i+|d|
(1− p)n−(i+|d|).
If we instead note that each bit is randomized independently by a bit randomizer MS with matrix
C 2−p
2
, then by applying Theorem 4.4 we get that for n ≥ 1
CMr,x =
p|x⊕r|(2− p)n−|x⊕r|
2n .
Algebraic manipulations yield that cr,x = CMr,x, and the value for c in Lemma 4.5 is
cM =
(
p2 − 2p+ 2
2(p− 1)2
)n
.
Figure 1(a) shows the effect of increasing the number of randomized response data points by a
factor L for computing pˆi. As expected, the plot for pˆi(L1000) is close to the target pˆi∗(1000).
Figure 1(b) shows the growth of log(fL(2(2n + 1)−1)) in n for three values of p. Figure 1(c) plots
the ratio of L and the approximated loss fL(2(2n + 1)−1) for 100 uniformly random distributions
pi and three probabilities p of 0.0001, 0.5, and 0.9999.
5.2 Warner’s Original Device: a Randomizer Comparison
Warner’s original randomizer involved a spinner with two areas “Yes” and “No”, with a probability
p for indicating “Yes”. The respondent was then asked to spin the spinner unseen by the interviewer
and respond with “yes” if the spinner indicated the respondent’s true answer to the sensitive
question and “no” otherwise. The corresponding bit randomizer MW has matrix Cp, which is
invertible if p 6= 0.5. Furthermore, we have that the value for c as defined in Lemma 4.5 is
cW =
(
2p2 − 2p+ 1
(2p− 1)2
)n
.
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Figure 1: (a): Plot of pˆi∗(1000), pˆi(1000), and pˆi(L1000) for 100 randomly generated datasets with the
same fixed pi = (0.05, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5)T , p = 0.5, and L = 9.75. (b): log(L) = log(fL(2(2n + 1)−1)) for
n = 1, 2, . . . , 12 and three values of p. (c): The ratio fL(pi
T pi)
fL(2(2n+1)−1)
for 100 random uniformly sampled pi
for each 2 ≤ n ≤ 12 and three values of p
We can use the ratio cM/cW to compare the estimators for pˆi corresponding to the independent
question and Warner’s original method, respectively. We have that cM/cW < 1 for p ∈ (0, 23 ).
Figure 2 (a) shows a plot of this ratio for n = 1. We see that when p < 23 , the unrelated question
randomizer is preferable with respect to estimating pi, and particularly so around p = 0.5 (cW
is undefined at p = 0.5). The preference regions are emphasized as n increases. However, if we
express cM and cW as functions of privacy level α using the results from Section 4.3, we get that
the two randomizers perform identically as
cM (α) = cW (α) =
(
exp(2α) + 1
(exp(α)− 1)2
)n
.
Figure 2 (b) shows cM (α) = cW (α) for α ∈ [0.2, 2] and n = 1.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) The ratio cM/cW for p ∈ (0, 0.8) and n = 1. (b) cM (α) = cW (α) for n = 1 and α ∈ [0.2, 2]
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5.3 The Rappor Randomizer
In Rappor, randomization is applied after an hashing of ordinal values onto a bit string. Here we
only examine the randomizer.
The Rappor randomizer is a bit-wise independent randomizer R(M1, . . . ,Mn) where Mi =
M for all i. The bit randomizer M is a combination of two bit randomizers, “Permanent
Randomized Response” (PR) and “Instantaneous Randomized Response” (IR), respectively. The
PR randomizer is the above MS randomizer with p = f , while
CMIR =
(
1− p 1− q
p q
)
.
A bit b decides the combination, where b = 1 is called “one-time” mode, and M(b) = (1− b)(MIR ◦
MS) + bMS . Consequently, CM(1) = C 2−f
2
. When p = 1− q, we recognize MIR as Warner’s MW
with parameter q, and CM(0) = Cq C 2−f
2
= Cq−(q− 12 )f . This means that the Rappor randomizer
is an iterated bisymmetric randomizer when p = 1− q or b = 1.
6 Conclusion
A family of randomized response methods is described and analyzed. Instances of both well
known classical and recently developed methods belong to this family. The analysis resulted in an
efficient algorithm for estimating multinomial population parameters from randomized responses,
and the statistical efficiency of the produced estimates was described.
The investigated statistical loss grows exponentially in the number of dimensions n, as does the
size of the matrix C that describes the effect of randomization on the multinomial parameters.
Consequently, the estimation of these multinomial parameters is only practical for small n, even
with a large number of observations. However, the knowledge of how statistical loss grows with
dimensionality allows the determination of a value k for which it is feasible to estimate parameters
for size k marginals. Since individual variables are randomized independently, only the variables
in the relevant feasible marginals need to be obtained. Furthermore, due to the independent
randomization of variables these can be queried interactively across distributed data sources.
Brevity is said to be a hallmark of simplicity (SOSA 2018). Simple algorithms are more likely to
be implemented and trusted by practitioners, their implementations are easier to maintain and
adapt to changing contexts, and they are easier to implement in constrained environments such
as in hardware (Muller-Hannemann and Schirra 2010). Simple algorithms are also easier to debug
and implement correctly, which is critical in systems that need to implement privacy and security
requirements. The algorithm presented here is simple. It centers on a short recursive definition of
the matrix C−1, which is shown implemented in four lines of Python, a multi-purpose programming
language with a significant current market-share. Furthermore, an implementation of the full
process of computing parameter estimates from binary randomized input was implemented in
an additional nine lines of Python code, making iterated bisymmetric randomizers a potentially
attractive alternative for randomized response applications.
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A Proofs
We start by making a key observation.
Observation 1:
Consider the 2n × 2n matrix C. If we let entry Cix′,jy′ = η((ix′) ⊕ (jy′)) = 2η(i⊕j) η(x′ ⊕ y′),
we get that Cx,y = 1n−|x⊕y| 2|x⊕y|. Since we can write C = J1 ⊗ J2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Jn where Jk is the
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2× 2 matrix J such that Ji,j = 2i⊕j , i.e., J =
(
1 2
2 1
)
, we get that Dx,y = an−|x⊕y| b|x⊕y| for
D = Ca,b(n) = B1 ⊗B2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Bn where Bk =
(
a b
b a
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Note that we can write
Tr(cov(pˆi(m))) =
∑
x
Var(pˆix(m)), Tr(cov(pˆi∗(m))) =
∑
x
Var(pˆi∗x(m))
Var(pˆix(m)) = m−1F (x, pi), Var(pˆi∗x(m)) = m−1G(x, pi)
where F and G are functions independent of m. Then for any positive integer m,
L(m) = m
−1∑
x F (x, pi)
m−1
∑
xG(x, pi)
=
∑
x F (x, pi)∑
xG(x, pi)
= L.
and ∑
x
Var(pˆix(αLm)) =
∑
x
α−1m−1L−1F (x, pi) ≤ m−1L−1
∑
x
F (x, pi)
=
∑
x
m−1G(x, pi) =
∑
x
Var(pˆi∗x(m)).
Furthermore,
E
(‖pˆi(m)− pi‖22) = E
(∑
x
(pˆix(m)− px)2
)
=
∑
x
E
(
(pˆix(m)− px)2
)
=
∑
x
Var(pˆix(m)),
and similarly E
(‖pˆi∗(m)− pi‖22) =∑xVar(pˆi∗x(m)). 
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
The proposition follows directly from Theorem 4.1. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3:
We first note that for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} we have that ς((2n − 1) − i) = 1 ⊕ ς(i). From this
and that ⊕ commutes, we get
1. |ς(i)⊕ ς(n− i)| = n, and
2. |ς(i)⊕ ς(j)| = |ς(2n − 1− j)⊕ ς(2n − 1− i)|.
The above and that the entry Ca,b(n)i,j = g(|ς(i) ⊕ ς(j)|, a, b) for some g, the proposition
follows. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.4:
The first equation follows directly from Observation 1. We have that Ca,b(1) is invertible if
a2 6= b2. From this and that (A⊗B) = (A−1 ⊗B−1) we complete the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5:
From Section 3.2 we have that
cov(pˆi(m)) = m−1
(
C−1diag(Cpi)C−1T − pipiT
)
.
By properties of the trace of matrix products and symmetry of C−1,
Tr
(
m−1
(
C−1diag(Cpi)C−1T − pipiT
))
= m−1
(
Tr
(
C−1diag(Cpi)C−1T
)
− Tr(pipiT )
)
= m−1
(
Tr(C−1C−1diag(Cpi))− s)
From (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = (AC)⊗ (BD) it follows that Ca(n)Ca(n) = Ca2+(1−a)2(n). From this
and Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 1 we get that the entry (C−1C−1)0,0 = f(n, a) where
f(n, a) =
(
a2 + (1− a)2
(2a− 1)2
)n
.
Furthermore, from Proposition 4.3 the diagonal entries of C−1C−1 are all f(n, a). Combining
this, that Tr(AB) =
∑
i,j(ABT )i,j , and
∑
x Cxpi = 1,
Tr(C−1C−1diag(Cpi)) =
∑
x
f(n, a)Cxpi = f(n, a)
∑
x
Cxpi = f(n, a),
and consequently, Tr(cov(pˆix(m))) = m−1 (f(n, a)− s). 
Proof of Theorem 4.6:
We have that
Tr(cov(pˆi∗)) = m−1 Tr(diag(pi)− pipiT ) = m−1(1− s).
From Lemma 4.5 and Proposition 3.1 we get that L = fL(s) = c−s(1−s) for c =
(
a2+(1−a)2
(2a−1)2
)n
. From
0 ≤ px ≤ 1 and
∑
x px = 1, s has a minimum when px = 1/2n for all x, and maximum when
px = 1 for a fixed x, and py = 0 for y 6= x. These values are then 2n(2n)2 = 2−n and 1, respectively.
The m’th derivative of fL(s) = c−s1−s wrt. 0 ≤ s < 1 is f (m)L (s) = m!(1−s)m (fL(s)− 1). The loss fL
therefore achieves its minimum at fL(2−n). 
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Proof of Proposition 4.7 (sketch):
The m’th derivative of fL(s) = c−s1−s wrt. 0 ≤ s < 1 is f (m)L (s) = m!(1−s)m (fL(s)− 1). Since c ≥ 1,
f
(m)
L ≥ 0 for all m > 0. In particular, we have that fL is convex, as is f (m)L for all m. Using the
expectation for a first order Taylor approximation for convex fL we have that for random variable
S
fL(E(S)) ≤ E(fL(S)) ≤ fL(E(S)) + λ2 Var(S) (*)
where λ = maxx∈I f (2)L (x) ≥ 0 for suitable interval I. Dividing (∗) by fL(E(S)) = L(n), we get
1 ≤ E(fL(S))
fL(E(S))
≤ 1 + δ,
where
δ = λVar(S)2fL(E(S))
.
Let S = piTpi. Recalling that c = c(a)n and expanding both numerator and denominator
at n = 3 (where the minimum occurs since fL is increasing and Var(S) and E(S) are both
decreasing in n), we see that δ(n) ∈ O(2−3n). Applying Chebyshev’s inequality, we have that
P (S ≥ E(S) + 10Var(S) 12 ) ≤ 0.01. Evaluating δ at E(S) + 10Var(S) 12 and n = 3, we arrive at
the numerical bound. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8:
Let the computation of Z⊗R require tf (n2) time for 2×2 matrix Z and R of size n×n. Then we
can compute Ra,b(n) at a time cost of t(n) = tf (22(n−1))+ t(n−1) =
∑n
i=0 tf (22i) =
∑n
i=0 tf (4i).
Letting tf (n) = k4n for some k, then t(n) = 4k
∑n
i=0 22i = 4k
∑n
i=0 4i = 4k(1 + 1−4
n
1−4 ) =
4k(1 + 4n−13 ). Now we have that t(n) = O(4n) = O(2n
2) = O(|Ra,b(n)|). In other words, the
singly recursive algorithm Ra,b(n) is linear in the time in the number of elements of the output
matrix as we can perform tf in linear time in the size of input R, in fact we can expect that
the Kronecker product can be implemented with k ≤ 3, due to reading, multiplication, and
writing. 
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